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Abstract—Vehicle-to-anything (V2X) communications are es-
sential for facilitating cooperative intelligent transport system
(C-ITS) components such as traffic safety and traffic efficiency
applications. Integral to proper functioning of C-ITS systems is
sensing and telemetery. To this end, this paper examines how
to ensure security in sensing systems for V2X networks. In
particular, secure remote estimation of a Gauss-Markov process
based on measurements done by a set of vehicles is considered.
The measurements are collected by the individual vehicles and
are communicated via wireless links to the central fusion center.
The system is attacked by malicious or compromised vehicles with
the goal of increasing the estimation error. The attack is achieved
by two mechanisms: false data injection (FDI) and garbage
packet injection. This paper extends a previously proposed
adaptive filtering algorithm for tackling FDI to accommodate
both FDI and garbage packet injection, by filtering out malicious
observations and thus enabling secure estimates. The efficacy of
the proposed filter is demonstrated numerically.
Index Terms—Secure remote estimation,V2X, V2V, false data
injection, packet drop attack, Kalman filter, stochastic approxi-
mation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-road-infrastructure
(V2I), and vehicular-to-network (V2N), collectively gathered
under the name vehicular-to-anything (V2X) communication,
are enablers for so-called cooperative intelligent transport
system (C-ITS) applications. C-ITS applications can be
broadly categorized into traffic safety and traffic efficiency
applications. V2X networks exhibit characteristics that differ
from classical cellular communication networks, largely
due to the potential high mobility of the vehicles. For
example, V2V networks have unique reliability and latency
requirements necessitating new resource allocation strategies
[1], [2]. Additionally, V2V channels have unique channel
characteristics that enable the design of channel estimation
strategies which directly exploit these features, such as group
and element-wise sparsity coupled with distinct patters of
diffusive multipath in the delay-Doppler plane [3].
In this paper, we consider a C-ITS application in which
a number of vehicles make noisy observations of a random
process (e.g., the current road conditions: temperature, friction,
etc.) and transmit the observations to a central data fusion
node, e.g., an edge computing device, see Figure 1. The objec-
tive is to leverage all vehicle sensors to perform high-precision
estimation of the realization of the random process. This can
subsequently be used to improve safety and efficiency, e.g., by
controlling the inter-vehicle distances for automated vehicles
and thereby ensuring safe and fuel-efficient travel.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the remote estimation problem.
Like any cyber-physical system (CPS), C-ITS applications
are subject to attacks to achieve various malicious goals.
Needless to say, such attacks can be life-threatening and cause
major damage to equipment. An unfortunate drawback with
V2X communication is that it opens up the possibility of an
attack on the vehicle systems, e.g., its sensors, from a distance
[4], or an attack on the overall application. Attacks could
either be denial-of-service attacks (e.g., jamming attack where
a jammer tries to block the wireless bandwidth, see [5], [6]),
or deception or integrity attacks where the attacker attempts
to modify the information sent via data packets. Examples of
integrity attacks could be a replay attack (see [7], [8]) and
the false data injection (FDI) attack considered in this paper.
An FDI attack modifies the data sent by the sensors to the
remote estimator, either by breaking into the cryptography or
by external manipulation of the sensors (e.g., placing a heater
near a temperature sensor or by attacking the internal bus
structure in the vehicle). FDI attacks on vehicle positioning or
velocity estimation schemes can have catastrophic impact such
as accidents in a vehicular network. Hence, secure estimation
in presence of such attacks is crucial for vehicle safety.
Herein, we propose a new attack type that has the capability
of incorporating unique features of the V2X channel. In
particular, we define a packet drop attack (PDA), which could
fall into either of these categories (jamming or FDI). Under
PDA, the malicious sensor sends a garbage packet instead of
the observation packet to the fusion center, with the intention
of making the remote estimator believe that the received
packet is corrupted by noise and not due to any malicious
attacker. Packet loss can also occur due to interference from
a jammer. PDA is harmful because the remote estimator
misses important observations that could have been used in
the estimation process. Another challenge is that PDAs can
be more challenging to disambiguate from actual packet losses
that are inherent in V2X networks.
As we define the PDA herein, such attacks have not been
previously examined in the literature, to our knowledge. In
contrast, there has been recent active attention paid to FDI
attacks. In [9], the conditions for an undetectable attack are
developed and the minimum number of attacked sensors is
determined to ensure undetectability. A linear deception attack
scheme is proposed in [10] to fool the popular χ2 detector;
later, a new algorithm was designed in [11] to tackle this
linear deception attack. The algorithm in [11] requires the
knowledge of a few safe sensors; this requirement was later
obviated in [12] wherein an adaptive filter using a stochastic
approximation technique is proposed.
Coding the sensor output for attack detection via a χ2 detec-
tor is examined in [13]; this scheme is vulnerable to breaches
in cryptographic security. Centralized and decentralized attack
detection schemes for noiseless systems are developed in
[14]. Attack-resilient state estimation with bounded noise was
discussed in [15]. Attack detection and secure estimation
for linear Gaussian systems was also considered in [16],
but this detection scheme, which uses Kalman innovation
sequence based detection, is not resilient against the linear
deception attack of [10]. An optimal attack strategy with a
control objective subject to a constraint on the attack detection
probability is designed in [17]. Sparsity models to characterize
the switching location attack in a noiseless linear system are
designed in [18] , while considering state recovery constraints
for various attack modes. Security against FDI attack in power
systems is discussed in [19], [20].
There has been some limited work investigating attacks
in specific vehicular networks. For example, secure estima-
tion in presence of an FDI attack is investigated in [21],
and the performance of the proposed algorithm is tested on
an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) networks. Alternatively,
[22] does design FDI attack detection scheme for vehicular
networks exploiting additional (noisy) side information such
as angle-of-arrival. Neither work above considers mobility as
captured by the PDA model we provide here; furthermore,
our methods do not require location side information. Instead,
we adapt the approach of [12] wherein malicious observations
are filtered without the need for location attributes or so-called
safe sensors.
In this paper, we make the following contributions. (i) We
extend the adaptive filter of [12] (designed to tackle FDI
attacks alone), in order to address PDA and FDI attacks simul-
taneously. The key idea is to minimize a linear combination
of three terms: the error under no attack, anomalies among
estimates returned by various sensor subsets, and the deviation
of the observed packet loss probability from the channel’s
packet error probability. We develop a learning algorithm to
learn a linear filter over time, in order to minimize the men-
tioned objective function. This is the first work that considers
secure estimation under a combination of PDA and FDI. (ii)
Numerical results show that the proposed adaptive filter offers
an error performance reasonably close to a Kalman filter that
knows the attacked sensor set and hence can completely ignore
the malicious observations. The proposed adaptive filter offers
an error performance much better than the traditional Kalman
filter under FDI and PDA attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model is provided in Section II. Secure estimation under PDA
and FDI attack is presented in Section III. Numerical results
are provided in Section IV, followed by the conclusion in
Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Throughout this paper, matrices and vectors will be denoted
by bold capital and bold small letters, and sets will be denoted
by bold letters with caligraphic font.
A. Sensing and estimation model
We consider a set of vehicles N := {1, 2, · · · , N} that
measures a discrete-time multi-dimensional stochastic process
{x(t)}t≥0 that evolves as
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + w(t), (1)
where the process noise w(t) ∼ N(0,Q) has covariance
matrix Q, and is i.i.d. across t. The observation made by
vehicle i at time t is
yi(t) = Cix(t) + vi(t), (2)
where Ci is the observation matrix of vehicle i, and the
observation noise vi(t) ∼ N(0,Ri). The observation noise
vi(t) is assumed to be independent across i and i.i.d. across t.
The pair (A,Q
1
2 ) is assumed to be stabilizable and (A,Ci)
is assumed to be detectable for all i ∈ N . The process and
observation models are known at the remote estimator.
The vehicles send their observation to a remote estimator
(e.g., a road-side unit containing an edge computing device)
via wireless links. The remote estimator estimates xˆ(t) at each
time t based on the received observations1. Due to fading in
wireless channels and receiver noise, the packet containing
the observation yi(t) is lost with a probability pi > 0 known
to the fusion center; the packet loss process is assumed to
be independent across vehicles and i.i.d. across time. The
assumption of known pi can be motivated as follows: packets
are tagged with the vehicle position and speed, and the fusion
center can learn the packet error probability of these vehicles
by observing data traffic over time. An example how the packet
error probability varies as a function of average SNR (distance)
and speed of vehicles for 802.11p-based transmission is found
in [23].
The remote estimator seeks to minimize the time-average
mean squared error (MSE):
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=0
E||x(t)− xˆ(t)||2. (3)
1For simplicity, we assume that observations are time-synchronized and
ignore transmission and processing delays. We can relax these assumptions,
but only at the cost of significantly more complicated notation and with no
real new insights.
If there is no packet error, the sensing and observation
models can be rewritten as:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + w(t)
y(t) = Cx(t) + v(t), (4)
where y(t) ∈ Rm×1 and v(t) ∈ Rm×1 are found by stacking
{yi(t)}1≤i≤N and {vi(t)}1≤i≤N , respectively. Hence, C =
(C′1 : C
′
2 : · · · : C′N )′ (where C′1 is the transpose of C1) and
v(t) ∼ N (0,R), where R = diag(R1,R2, . . . ,RN ). The
minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) estimator in this case
is the Kalman filter (see [24]):
xˆt+1|t = Axˆt
Pt+1|t = APtA′ + Q
Kt+1 = Pt+1|tC′(CPt+1|tC′ + R)−1
xˆt+1 = xˆt+1|t + Kt+1(y(t+ 1)−Cxˆt+1|t)
Pt+1 = (I−Kt+1C)Pt+1|t, (5)
where xˆt+1 is the estimate, and Pt+1 is the the error covari-
ance matrix for xˆt+1, given that xˆ0 ∼ N (0,P0). It can be
shown that limt→∞Pt+1|t = P¯ exists and that it is the unique
fixed point to the Pt+1|t iteration called the Riccati equation
[24]. The vector sequence zt := y(t)−Cxˆt|t−1 is called the
innovation sequence; it was proved in [24] that {zt}t≥1 is a
zero-mean Gaussian sequence, pairwise independent across t,
and its steady-state covariance matrix is Σz := (CP¯C′+R).
B. Attack Model
We assume that an unknown subset A ⊂ N of vehicles
can be attacked by an external attacker (with the number of
attacked vehicles bounded as |A| ≤ n0 < N ). If vehicle i is
under attack, then, at a given time t, it either introduces an
error ei(t) into the observation with an unknown probability
(1 − qi), or sends a garbage packet to the remote estimator
with probability qi. Let Ii,g(t) be the indicator that vehicle i’s
sensor sends a garbage packet and Ii,l(t) be the indicator that
a packet is lost due to fading or receiver noise. Let Ii,g⊕l(t) =
Ii,g(t)⊕ Ii,l(t), where ⊕ stands for the logical OR operation,
and let ∅ denote any garbage packet or lost packet.
The received observation at the remote estimator at time t
from vehicle i is
yi(t) =

Cix(t) + ei(t) + vi(t), i ∈ A, Ii,g⊕l(t) = 0
∅, i ∈ A, Ii,g⊕l(t) = 1
Cix(t) + vi(t), i /∈ A, Ii,l(t) = 0
∅, i /∈ A, Ii,l(t) = 1
(6)
The attacker injects the error sequence {ei(t)}t≥1 for all i ∈
A and sometimes sends garbage packets in order to maximize
the MSE given by (3).
III. SECURE ESTIMATION
Here we will extend the secure estimation algorithm of
[12] to the case where both FDI and PDA attacks can be
present simultaneously, under the situation where the remote
estimator does not have additional side information such as
the identity of the attacked sensors or any safe sensor subset.
This algorithm does not detect any attack, so this will be
mostly useful for the situation where the system administrator
cannot take necessary measures even if an attack is detected.
Note that, if an attack detector is employed, then the remote
estimator has the liberty to ignore the observations coming
from the sensors that are declared malicious by the detector;
but this approach will result in a loss of important information
revealed by the malicious sensor observations. Hence, our
proposed algorithm fuses all sensor observations at the remote
estimator. The basic idea behind the proposed algorithm is to
choose the filter gain matrix in a way so that the estimate
anomalies from various vehicle sensor subsets are close to
each other. However, since the observation noise at various
sensors have different statistics, the objective function should
also acount for the MSE when there is no attack. When a PDA
attack is present, the packet loss rate for sensor i ∈ A will
be higher than pi; hence, the deviation of the observed packet
loss rate from pi also needs to be optimized.
In order to perform the optimization, we focus on the class
of linear estimators similar to the Kalman filter in (5); but
here the gain matrix Kt+1 is learned via stochastic gradient
descent. The goal is to minimize the time-average cost function
provided in (7) (next page) over the gain matrix sequence
{Kt}t≥0.
In (7), the single stage cost c(t) has various components.
The first term Tr(Pt) is the MSE when there is no attack;
this is a random variable where the randomness comes from
randomized {Kt}t≥0 update and channel errors. The second
term captures the anomaly in estimates xˆB(t) and xˆBc(t)
coming from vehicle sensor subsets B of size n0 and its
complement, maximized over various subsets of size n0. The
number of times a garbage packet is received from vehicle
sensor i due to channel error or due to attack is denoted by
Ni(t); under no attack, Ni(t)/t converges to pi almost surely,
but converges to 1− (1− pi)(1− qi) when there is an attack.
The term (1+ξ
∑
i∈Bmax{Ni(t)/t−pi, 0}) puts a penalty for
a vehicle sensor subset from which we observe more packet
drops than expected. The multipliers λ > 0 and ξ > 0 capture
the weights of various cost components.
A. The proposed algorithm
Since we do not have any closed form expression of the
objective function in (7), direct computation of the gradient
w.r.t. Kt is difficult. We will minimize the cost function (7) by
iteratively learning an optimal gain matrix K∗ via stochastic
gradient descent (we update Kt in an on-line fashion), as
more observations are gathered. Hence, we use simultaneous
perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA, see [25]) for
gradient estimation, where, all elements of Kt are perturbed
simultaneously by a random vector in two opposite directions
in order to obtain K+t and K
−
t , and a noisy gradient estimate
of the single stage cost is obtained from the single stage cost
values evaluated at these two perturbed gain matrices K+t and
K−t . This noisy gradient estimate is used in stochastic gradient
descent.
lim sup
τ↑∞
1
τ
τ∑
t=0
E
[
Tr(Pt) + λ maxB∈2N :|B|=n0
||xˆB(t)− xˆBc(t)||2
(
1 + ξ
∑
i∈B
max{Ni(t)/t− pi, 0}
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=c(t)
(7)
The algorithm uses two non-negative sequences {a(t)}t≥0
and {b(t)}t≥0 satisfying the following conditions:
1)
∑∞
t=0 a(t) =∞,
2)
∑∞
t=0 a
2(t) <∞,
3) limt→∞ b(t) = 0,
4) limt→∞ a2(t)/b2(t) < ∞ with a(t) = t−k1 , b(t) =
t−k2 , and
5) k1 ∈ ( 12 , 1], k2 ∈ (0, 12 ).
The first two conditions are standard for stochastic approxima-
tion (see [26]). The third condition ensures that the gradient
estimate is asymptotically unbiased. The fourth condition is
required for the convergence of SPSA (see [25]). The fifth
condition is required for the convergence of the asynchronous
stochastic approximation used in this algorithm.
The algorithm also requires a large constant l > 0.
Let us pick a small number δ > 0, and define K :=
{K ∈ Rq×m : ||λmax(I − KC)|| ≤ 1 − δ}. Recalling
that {Kt}t≥0 is updated iteratively, let Gt, G+t , G−t and
Ct denote the restrictions of Kt, K+t , K
−
t and C to the
vehicle sensors whose observations are received properly by
the remote estimator at time t; hence, if Kt is known, the
fusion center can compute Gt by looking at the packets
received from all sensors at time t. Let Gt,B, G+t,B and G
−
t,B
denote the restrictions of Kt, K+t and K
−
t to the vehicle
sensors belonging to the sensor subset B whose observations
are received properly by the remote estimator at time t. Let us
denote the sensor corresponding to the j-th column of Kt by
sj . The proposed SECEST (abbreviation for secure estimation)
algorithm is given below.
The SECEST Algorithm
Input: l, δ, λ, ξ, n0, {pi}1≤i≤N .
Initialization: K1, P0, xˆ(0) = 0.
For t = 1, 2, 3, . . .
1) Collect yt from all sensors (excluding garbage packets).
2) Declare the estimate xˆ(t) = Axˆ(t − 1) + Gt(yt −
CtAxˆ(t− 1)).
3) Compute the error covariance matrix Pt := (I −
GtCt)(APt−1A′ + Q)(I−GtCt)′ + GtR(Gt)′.
4) Pick a random matrix ∆t ∈ {−1, 1}q×m such that each
entry of ∆t is chosen independently with probability 12 .
5) Compute K+t := Kt+b(t)∆t and K
−
t := Kt−b(t)∆t.
6) Compute the pseudo-estimates xˆ+B (t) = Axˆ(t − 1) +
G+t,B(yt − CtAxˆ(t − 1)) and xˆ−B (t) = Axˆ(t − 1) +
G−t,B(yt − CtAxˆ(t − 1)), and similarly xˆ+Bc(t) and
xˆ−Bc(t) for all sensor subsets B of size n0.
7) Compute the pseudo error covariance matrix P+t := (I−
G+t Ct)(APt−1A
′+Q)(I−G+t Ct)′+G+t R(G+t )′ and
similarly compute P−t .
8) Compute c+(t) := Tr(P+t ) +
λ(maxB∈2N :|B|=n0 ||xˆ+B (t) − xˆ+Bc(t)||2(1 +
ξ
∑
i∈Bmax{Ni(t)t − pi, 0})), and similarly c−(t).
9) SPSA update: For all (i, j) such that Isj ,g⊕l = 0:
Kˆt+1(i, j) =
[
Kt(i, j)−a(t−Nsj (t))×
c+(t)− c−(t)
2b(t)∆t(i, j)
]l
−l
(8)
Project Kˆt+1 on K to obtain Kt+1.
end
Observations:
• Equation (8) is a stochastic gradient descent algorithm.
A noisy estimate of the gradient of Ec(t) w.r.t. Kt(i, j)
is used, which is c
+(t)−c−(t)
2b(t)∆t(i,j)
.
• (8) is an asynchronous stochastic approximation iteration
(see [26]).
• We project Kˆt+1(i, j) onto a compact interval [−l, l]
to ensure stability of the (8) iteration. Also, |λmax(I −
Kt+1C ≤ (1 − δ) is maintained, since this ensures that
the Pt iteration remains bounded in case there is no
packet loss (see [12]); ensuring stability and convergence
of SECEST under packet loss and injection attack is left
for future research.
• The error covariance matrix evolves as:
Pt := (I−GtCt)(APt−1A′+Q)(I−GtCt)′+GtR(Gt)′ (9)
where Kt is not updated optimally according to (5). This
motivates step 3 and step 7.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here we numerically demonstrate the efficacy of SECEST
for secure remote estimation. In [12], the authors compared a
similar algorithm with the algorithm of [11], but [11] is not
designed to handle packet errors. Hence, we compare our SE-
CEST algorithm against a Kalman filter that perfectly knows
at any given time instant which sensors are under attack; this
benchmark algorithm is called GENIE. In GENIE, the Kalman
filter ignores the observations coming from malicious sensors.
We also compare the MSE performance of SECEST with a
standard Kalman filter which is unaware of any attack; this
algorithm is called KALMAN.
We consider a static attack (where the attacked sensor subset
does not vary with time) as well as a switching location
attack (where the attacked sensor subset varies with time).
In each case, we consider an independent realization of a
problem instance with the following parameter values. The
state transition matrix A is taken as 0.5 times a randomly
generated q × q stochastic matrix. Matrix Q is chosen to be
a positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix, whose square root is
0.1 times a q × q random matrix whose entires uniformly
chosen from [−1, 1]. The matrix R is also generated similarly.
Figure 2. Performance comparison of SECEST against GENIE and
KALMAN, under static attack (top) and switching location attack (bottom).
N = 8, n0 = 3, k = 3, q = 3, λ = 1, ξ = 1. T = 20 for switching
location attack. Different realizations for system model are considered in the
two plots. GENIE-K and GENIE-NK have very close MSE values, hence a
single plot is provided for them.
Observation matrix C ∈ RkN×q is chosen randomly from
[0, 1]kN×q; the observation made by each sensor is a k-
dimensional column vector. The maximum number of sensors
that can be under attack at a time is denoted by n0.
For all simulation instances, the channel error probability
is chosen to be 0.05, and the value of qi for each i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N} is chosen independently and uniformly from
[0, 0.1]. For ease of computation, it is assumed that if a sensor
i is under attack, then the packet sent by that sensor is lost
with probability 0.05+ qi; this is a valid approximation since
these probabilities are small.
The attacker always changes the sign of the innovation
vectors coming from malicious sensors; this is the the worst
possible linear attack [10] when the remote estimator uses a
Kalman filter for estimation. In this case, let the true observa-
tion made at the sensors be y(t) (ignoring lost packets), and let
the restriction of C to the sensors whose observations are not
lost at time t be C(t). Some of the received packets will con-
tain false observations. Let us consider another matrix Ca(t)
which is same as C(t), except that the entries corresponding
to the benign (not malicious) sensors whose observations are
received successfully are set to 0. Similarly, let ya(t) be same
as y(t), except that the entries corresponding to the benign
sensors whose observations are received successfully are 0.
We consider the situations where the attacker knows the
estimate made by the remote estimator, and where the attacker
can only run a Kalman filter in order to guess the estimate at
the remote estimator. When the attacker knows the estimate
made by the remote estimator, the received observation at
time t at the remote estimator becomes y˜(t) = y(t) +
2Ca(t)Axˆ(t − 1) − 2ya(t); this is equivalent to inverting
the sign of the innovation vector. We call the corresponding
variants of SECEST, KALMAN and GENIE by SECEST-K,
KALMAN-K and GENIE-K (with knowledge of the estimate).
However, if xˆ(t− 1) is not known to the attacker, then the
attacker can run a Kalman filter on the received observations
at the estimator, in order to maintain a proxy xˆkalman(t− 1)
for xˆ(t−1). In this case, the the received observation at time t
at the remote estimator is y˜(t) = y(t)+2Ca(t)Axˆkalman(t−
1) − 2ya(t). We call the corresponding variants of SECEST,
KALMAN and GENIE by SECEST-NK, KALMAN-NK and
GENIE-NK (no knowledge of estimate).
Static attack: Here we assume that a fixed subset of n0
sensors are under attack, and compare the time-average MSE
of GENIE-K, GENIE-NK, KALMAN-K and KALMAN-NK
with the time-variation of SECEST-K and SECEST-NK along
different sample paths (due to the ergodicity of the processes)
for the same problem instance; we ran simulation for multiple
problem instances to verify the trend in our findings. Since
GENIE-K and GENIE-NK yield very small MSE and they
are close to each other, we provide one single curve for both
of them. The top plot in Figure 2 shows that the time-average
MSE of SECEST converges to a value reasonably close to the
average MSE of GENIE for both case where the estimate is or
is not available to the attacker. Also, SECEST performs much
better than KALMAN in both cases; in fact, the margin of
improvement over KALMAN is observed to be much higher
in many other problem instances.
Switching location attack: At time t = 1, T +1, 2T +1, · · ·
(with T = 20), a random sensor subset of size n0 is chosen
in an i.i.d. fashion, and this subset is attacked over the next
T slots for PDA attack and FDI via sign inversion of the
innovation sequence. The probability of attacking a sensor i
is proportional to 1i2 . The bottom plot of Figure 2 again shows
that SECEST provides a much better MSE than KALMAN.
It is important to note that, the performance of SECEST
can be further improved by choosing ξ and λ optimally; the
numerical results provided here are only for one particular
(λ, ξ) pair. On-line learning of these parameter values is left
for future research endeavours.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Herein, we propose a generalized model for attacks in a
V2X network with application to C-ITS systems. As C-ITS
systems rely heavily on telemetry (sensor) information in order
to provide traffic management and vehicular safety, attack
mitigation is critical. The new attack model incorporates the
classical false data injection attack as well as the newly defined
packet drop attack which has the capability of capturing V2X
channel characteristics induced by mobility. We have devel-
oped a secure estimation algorithm (SECEST) under both false
data injection and packet drop attacks. The proposed SECEST
algorithm extends the simultaneous perturbation stochastic
approximation based techniques provided in [12] for secure
estimation against false data injection attacks alone, to the
case where the packet drop attack is present along with the
injection attack. Numerical results demonstrate the efficacy of
the proposed algorithm. In particular, SECEST outperforms a
standard Kalman filter significantly, and performs reasonably
close to a strategy which has side information about the
identity of the attacked sensors.
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